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The decommissioned Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Plant is situated on Bailey
Peninsula in Wiscasset. The facility went online in 1972 and produced power
until the middle of the 1990s. Maine Historical Society Collections.
 
MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT: A TECHNOLOGICAL UTOPIA
IN RETROSPECT 
By Howard P. Segal
The Maine Yankee nuclear power plant, built in 1968 and closed in
1996, provides a revealing case study of the rise and fall of the nuclear
power industry in the United States. At its inception, the plant generated
a great outpouring of optimistic superlatives promising electricity “too
cheap to meter” and a solution to Maine’s longstanding energy prob-
lems. Its promoters envisioned a technological utopia for Maine commu-
nities based on cheap and efficient energy, and based on these promising
prospects, the town of Wiscasset welcomed the plant. This article traces
the changes in public thinking that led to statewide referenda on the
question of nuclear power in 1980, 1982, and 1987, and it highlights the
anti-utopian fears that fueled these campaigns. Howard Segal is a pro-
fessor of history specializing in history of technology at the University of
Maine, having joined the faculty there in 1986. His publications include
Technological Utopianism in American Culture (1985); Future Im-
perfect: The Mixed Blessings of Technology in America (1994); Tech-
nology in America: A Brief History (1989); and Recasting the Ma-
chine Age: Henry Ford’s Village Industries (2001). His current research
involves a history of high-tech technological utopias in America.
THE HISTORY of Maine’s only nuclear power plant, Maine Yan-kee, is a superb case study of the rise and fall of the nuclear powerindustry in the United States in the second half of the twentieth
century. Maine Yankee was the nation’s thirtieth nuclear power plant
when it opened in 1972. The plant was located on an 800-acre tract six
miles from the center of Wiscasset, a town of over 3,600 on Route 1
whose motto has long been “The Prettiest Village in Maine.” The town
has handsome old sea captains’ houses and other remnants from its rich
maritime history, and for local citizens the plant did not seem an affront
to its charm. Promoters of other scenic Maine communities might dis-
agree over the motto’s accuracy, but within Wiscasset, the overall popu-
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larity of the plant during most of its years of operation—it closed in
1996—cannot be disputed.
The plant was built between 1968 and 1972 at a cost of 231 million
dollars and was granted a forty-year license. The plant’s largest share-
holder was Maine Yankee Power Company, which owned 38 percent of
its assets.1 The company chose Wiscasset for several reasons: its suffi-
cient land area, its proximity to fresh water and to the ocean, its nearby
railroad and highway routes, its nearness to electrical load centers and to
transmission lines, its excellent bedrock for foundations, and its “favor-
able geologic, hydrologic, seismologic, and meteorological characteris-
tics”2
The Wiscasset Facility was one of several nuclear power plants built
by Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, which was established in
1954 after President Dwight Eisenhower signed the amended Atomic
Energy Act that, for the first time, allowed private companies to build
atomic facilities. The legislation was part of Eisenhower’s “Atoms for
Peace” policy, which was designed to ameliorate national anxiety over
atomic power—a sentiment that dates back to the dropping of atomic
bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Moreover, a peaceful civilian role
for atomic power shrewdly offset Cold War tensions repeatedly raised by
Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, whose combative
rhetoric suggested the likelihood of nuclear war against the Soviet
Union in the not too distant future. Further contributing to the “Atoms
for Peace” proposal was the allure of “electrical power too cheap to me-
ter,” as promised by Atomic Energy Commission chairman Lewis Strauss
in the early 1950s.3
A brochure entitled “The Yankee Story,” first published in 1960,
stated that the company’s founders “recognized that an entirely new and
plentiful source of energy was to be found within the atom” and that
generating electricity in this fashion would first become practical in ar-
eas like New England. Water power in New England had been “effec-
tively harnessed” for centuries, while coal and oil had to be “imported
from considerable distances.” And in the words of company president
William Webster: “we felt that here was a job for private enterprise and
industry, not the government. Call this the old Yankee pioneering spirit,
if you will.”4
Maine Yankee Atomic Electric Power’s first plant, opening in 1960,
was Yankee Atomic at Rowe, Massachusetts; it closed in 1992. In 1968
came Connecticut Yankee in Haddam Neck, which closed in 1996. “The
Yankee Story” announced four other New England nuclear power plants
in its undated seventh edition including: Millstone 1 in Waterford, Con-
Maine History
necticut, which opened in 1970 and closed in 1998; Millstone 2 and 3,
which started in 1975 and 1986 respectively and continue to operate;
Pilgrim in Plymouth, Massachusetts; Seabrook in New Hampshire; and
Vermont Yankee in Vernon, Vermont.
Complementing “The Yankee Story” was another brochure entitled
“The Atom, Electricity, and You!”5 The publication’s cartoons feature
“The Fosters,” as a stereotypical white middle-class family consisting of a
father, mother, son, and daughter. The Fosters respond to an invitation
from the electric company to attend a presentation on “The Atom, Elec-
tricity, and You—Today’s Greatest Exhibit.”6 The meeting’s speaker, John
Blaine, summarizes various appliances that have vastly improved Ameri-
cans’ lives and that have been powered by electricity. Blaine informs the
audience that families are “using more electricity than ever before,” but
the cost per kilowatt hour is dropping. However, Blaine goes on to ex-
plain that generating sufficient water power to meet this growing de-
mand for electricity would be much too expensive, and using more coal
and oil to manufacture electricity would likewise prove costly. The prac-
tical alternative is nuclear energy: “the miracle product of the splitting of
the atom.”7
Blaine then explains the workings of a nuclear power plant. He does-
n’t mention safety concerns because, presumably, there are none. “And
get this: there are no storage problems when this wonderful fuel is used.
Plants no longer must store reserve coal or tanks of oil.” As for “what
happens when the fuel is used up,” Blaine responds that it would never
be completely exhausted. The fuel rods in the center of the assembly
would give out first, and rods from the outer regions would be “moved
in turn towards the center.”8
Regarding any “danger from radiation in the vicinity” of a plant,
Blaine reassures his audience that “there’s considerably less radiation
from such a plant than from the radium on the dial of your wristwatch.”
Every day, moreover, people are exposed to radiation “in mountain vaca-
tion areas and jet flights, for example,” and those exposures are often “far
greater than radiation from nuclear plants—and they don’t cause the
slightest harm.”9
Waxing slightly historical about radiation, Blaine reminds his audi-
ence that “man’s been living with them for quite a few years now, with no
problems whatsoever,” drawing attention to atomic submarines and
atomic ships as well as the sixteen existing nuclear power plants. The
electric power companies “are very conscious of radiation problems—
and have successfully solved them.”10
Not surprisingly, given the trouble-free history of nuclear power in
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Pamphlets such as these were used
to convince the public of the prom-
ise of civilian nuclear technology.
Nuclear power, like hydro power a
century and a half earlier, would
revolutionize New England and the
country at large, stimulating con-
tinued progress and prosperity.
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America, “many more nuclear generating plants will be built!” Further-
more, Blaine reminded readers, once nuclear fuel is no longer needed, it
could be used for other purposes such as medicine, industry, and space
travel. Ordinary citizens could look forward to “nuclear-powered air-
planes, automobiles, trains—and just about anything and everything
that moves under its own power.” The nation has “entered the nuclear
age that will make our living easier and more productive!” The Foster
family thanks Blaine for his uplifting presentation and concludes that
“one thing’s sure—it’s going to be a great thing for all of us!”11
Over its lifetime, the single-unit 900 megawatt plant was Maine’s
largest generator of electricity, producing about 119 billion kilowatt
hours. According to retired University of Maine mechanical engineering
professor Richard Hill, the average Maine household’s annual electricity
use is about 7,000 kilowatt hours. With about 400,000 households in the
state, Maine Yankee’s lifetime production amounted to that used by all of
the state’s households for roughly forty years, and at a very low cost.12
During its years of operation, Maine Yankee contributed twelve mil-
lion dollars in property taxes to Wiscasset. That in turn cut ordinary res-
idents’ property taxes by 90 percent. In addition, the plant’s workers—
480 full-timers when it closed — spread their incomes through the
community. Not surprisingly, the town was able to dramatically improve
its schools, parks, and roads, to increase its fire and police departments,
to build a new cutting-edge community center, and to provide free am-
bulance service — to the envy of nearby communities with traditional
property tax bases. As local resident John Chester put it, “It was like liv-
ing in fairyland. Everything you wanted, you got.” Or in the words of
Judy Flanagan, a member of Wiscasset’s board of selectmen, “We called it
the golden goose.”13
Those who worked at Maine Yankee were satisfied with their jobs
and employment conditions. Engineer Bryan Selee recounted that a job
there “was a good job to have, good benefits, the job security was there.”
He met his wife at the plant, and his father, stepmother, and father-in-
law worked there. Selee believed that opponents often lacked sufficient
understanding of the competence and concern of the staff.14
The majority of residents of Vernon, Vermont, the site of Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Plant, held a similarly positive attitude. The town of
1,200 enjoyed property tax reductions and municipal improvements af-
ter Vermont Yankee opened in 1972. Yet within the first twenty months
of its operation, numerous faulty parts problems, outages, and minor ac-
cidents closed the plant down seventeen times—difficulties that did not
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plague Maine Yankee in most of its years of operation. Still, “did you ever
buy a car that operated 100 per cent effectively when you got it,” asked
town official Erma Puffer. Similar sentiments might have arisen in Wis-
casset had Maine Yankee experienced comparable challenges in its initial
years, and certainly Maine Yankee had like-minded defenders years later,
when serious problems did arise. Puffer dismissed concerns over nuclear
waste: “if the Good Lord is smart enough to let them build a nuclear
plant, He’s smart enough to give them a way to get rid of the waste.” Sig-
nificantly, in both communities residents appeared to be quite familiar
with the complexities of nuclear power “because of extensive media cov-
erage and well-organized public relations campaigns by the power com-
panies.”15
Nothing, perhaps, is more reflective of Wiscasset’s official warm em-
brace of Maine Yankee than its inclusion in the fifth edition of a brochure
entitled “Wiscasset Invites You” that appeared shortly after the plant
opened. The publication, intended for prospective businesspeople, home
buyers, and tourists, touted Wiscasset as “a town where a great historical
past truly blends with a promising future.” After a summary of the com-
munity’s history and descriptions of some of its municipal buildings, the
brochure offered a two-page discussion of the Wiscasset steam-electric
generating installation, Mason Station, owned by Central Maine Power,
the state’s largest hydro company. The station, cited as the town’s largest
employer next to Maine Yankee, moved to Wiscasset in large part because
of the people: “CMP was made to feel that it would be welcome in Wis-
casset, whether the installation it planned be small or large.”16 No doubt
this explained the site selection for Maine Yankee as well.
Following the articles on Mason Station and Maine Yankee came sec-
tions on transportation, schools, municipal improvements, churches, li-
brary, art galleries, and historical points of interest. What is revealing
about these topics is the inclusion of the two power plants as fully inte-
grated features of the community rather than, as one might have ex-
pected, industrial concerns discussed somewhat apart from the conven-
tional institutions and structures one finds in most old Maine
communities. It is the very banality of this order of topics that reinforces
the notion of Maine Yankee’s warm embrace by Wiscasset as just another
part of the community.
A similar optimism can be found in the undated brochure published
by Maine Yankee for its Energy Information Center. “If you live in
Maine, chances are you use electricity from Maine Yankee every day,” the
brochure states. It was not only the state’s single largest source of elec-
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tricity but also “the nation’s third most productive nuclear plant” —
however one measures that. The challenge to visitors was to test one’s
“Energy IQ.” The Center included “wall displays, scale models of the
plant, and interactive computer games” intended to “make energy edu-
cation fun.” The Center’s staff was prepared “to make scientific princi-
ples understandable and to answer your toughest questions”—although
one wonders about their reaction to any serious questioning of nuclear
power. The Center also offered plant tours for visitors eighteen years old
and beyond. “Whatever you thought you knew about nuclear power, we
invite you to come and find out for yourself”—the subtext being that
any skepticism would be overcome by the proverbial unvarnished
truth.17
In these respects Maine Yankee was a veritable technological utopia,
especially in its early years when nuclear power was widely touted
throughout the world as a safe, efficient, and inexpensive alternative to
conventional energy sources like coal and oil. In those days, there were
still echoes of the kinds of genuinely utopian visions held out for nuclear
power in the 1950s and 1960s, as outlined in Stephen Del Sesto’s now
classic 1986 article, “Wasn’t the Future of Nuclear Engineering Wonder-
ful?”18 These claims included a variety of domestic uses: nuclear explo-
sions for excavating irrigation projects; individually operated nuclear-
powered cars and even airplanes for easier transportation in big cities;
employment of nuclear-powered rocket ships for space exploration and
travel; nuclear-powered medical devices to cure cancer, heart disease,
arthritis, and other life-threatening ailments; and nuclear mechanisms
to transform deserts into agricultural gardens.
The Nuclear Controversy
On December 28, 1977, Maine Yankee Power Company held a party
celebrating the plant’s first five years of accident-free operation. The
plant had produced almost twenty-three billion kilowatt hours of elec-
tricity without any environmental problems, saving Maine consumers
“some $150 million over five years because it replaced about 40 million
barrels of high-priced fuel oil.” Yet officials feared that any proposals for
other nuclear power plants in the state would be met by strong opposi-
tion. “If you want to build a nuclear plant,” warned company president
Elwin Thurlow, “you will have to spend $50 to $75 million before you
know whether the government will let you build the plant.” Thurlow
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blamed President Jimmy Carter, who was, ironically, a self-proclaimed
expert in nuclear engineering, based on his undergraduate studies at the
United States Naval Academy.19
As Thurlow’s comments suggest, concern about nuclear power was
rising during Maine Yankee’s early years. As early as 1977, at the bequest
of parents of schoolchildren, Wiscasset formed a committee to come up
with a town evacuation plan in case of a serious accident at Maine Yan-
kee.20 This concern peaked during the potential meltdown at Three Mile
Island near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in 1979, and the actual meltdown
at Chernobyl in the Ukraine in 1986.21 Still, it would be wrong to over-
look the opposition that had developed before these accidents, not least
to Maine Yankee, albeit largely from persons outside of the immediate
Wiscasset area. From 1967 through 1972 the Coalition for Safe Power
tried but failed to stop construction. It did succeed in convincing the
Nuclear Power Commission to enforce stricter environmental standards
and monitoring.22
In the aftermath of Three Mile Island, opponents managed to launch
an official state referendum on the plant’s continued operation in 1980
and again in 1982.23 Both lost, as did a third and final referendum in
1987 following the Chernobyl disaster. Yet the 1980 referendum was the
first anywhere in the United States to challenge an existing nuclear
power plant. Threats of a referendum a year or two earlier were dropped
when proposals for a second plant on Sears Island were dropped.24 Two
years earlier voters in Montana—then one of sixteen states without a
nuclear power plant—had voted to ban the construction of all such
plants. The 1980 referendum failed by a margin of 230,000 to 160,000.
Amazingly, more than half of Maine’s eligible voters cast ballots. During
the early 1980s opposition throughout New England generated anti-nu-
clear positions based on cost, safety, and environmental concerns.25
All three referenda garnered more than 40 percent of the vote in fa-
vor of closing the plant down. Not surprisingly, defenders of Maine Yan-
kee criticized these exercises in democracy as asking ordinary citizens to
vote on highly technical matters about which they had no expertise.26
Yet in so much as Wiscasset residents knew a lot about nuclear power,
and Maine voters had access to comparable information through the
campaign literature, this complaint seems anti-democratic and techno-
cratic.
Raymond Shadis, spokesman for the anti-nuclear Friends of the
Coast-Opposing Nuclear Pollution, cynically called Wiscasset’s attitude
toward Maine Yankee a “cargo cult,” the anthropological term invoked to
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During the 1950s and 1960s,
the prevailing attitudes to-
ward nuclear power were
overwhelmingly optimistic.
As depicted in these cartoons,
consumers and producers
alike believed that nuclear
power would provide safe and
reliable power at a dramati-
cally reduced cost. This opti-
mism eroded in the wake of
the Three Mile Island disaster
and growing concerns over
the disposal of spent fuel rods
and radioactive material.
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characterize a group’s willingness to worship a god in return for its
“bounty.”27 Thus others’ characterization of the plant as a veritable
utopia was for Shadis and his fellow critics the very opposite: the plant
was an anti-utopia, or dystopia. Residents of Vernon, Vermont, simulta-
neously attributed opposition to Vermont Yankee to those “from away,”
be they recent arrivals in town or city folks. This naturally reduced the
legitimacy of the critiques, regardless of actual facts and figures. Shadis,
however, lived on a farm in Edgecomb, only two miles from Maine Yan-
kee.28
In fact, Maine Yankee’s opponents ultimately, if indirectly, prevailed
years later when the plant’s owners decided to close it down for financial
and safety reasons—reasons espoused by the opponents years before. In
1994 officials discovered cracks in the plant’s steam generator tubes, and
repairs required a year-long shutdown. In 1996 the plant was closed
again, and in the following year its owners concluded that the recent pas-
sage of Maine’s electric restructuring and deregulation legislation made it
impossible to operate at a profit, as its monopoly status had been ended.
Cheaper electricity could now flow across the state’s borders.
Closing Maine Yankee
Some of these problems would surely have been discovered in due
course, but an anonymous letter sent in 1995 by someone claming to be
an employee with extensive inside knowledge triggered safety inspec-
tions by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The letter alleged that
“engineers manipulated computer simulations and codes to hide poten-
tially serious deficiencies in the reactor’s emergency-cooling system.”29
The writer contended that the faulty data and simulations demonstrated
that the plant could safely operate at higher power outputs—outputs re-
quiring increased license power levels—when in fact that was a risky
strategy.
Commission investigations confirmed these allegations and blamed
them, along with other safety and maintenance problems, “on the ‘lack
of a questioning culture’ among managers, who placed cost savings
ahead of safety improvements.” After the report came out, Maine Yan-
kee’s computer “crashed for two days, eight workers were exposed to ra-
dioactive gas in the spent fuel area, and a radioactive chair was discov-
ered at the guard station.” Additional reviews discovered that the plant
had been improperly built, with “redundant” electrical cables having
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been “improperly separated.” In 1997 the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion cited Maine Yankee as among the country’s worst run nuclear
plants.30 All of these developments led to the resignation of the com-
pany’s president and to the board of directors’ decision to close the
plant, unless a buyer could be found. That decision was greeted enthusi-
astically by most residents of the adjoining areas.
Not surprisingly, there were no buyers. Officials hoped to dismantle
the plant for use elsewhere, but they found no buyers for this approach
either, despite an Internet site that attracted 70,000 visits—this at a time
when the Internet was relatively new and nowhere as widely used as
now. Once the decision to close had been made, an eight-year $500 mil-
lion decommissioning process began in 1997.31
In terms of both safety and budget, this process has gone very well.
In 2000 workers began gutting some of the plant’s structures; in 2003 the
plant’s reactor section was put on a barge and shipped to a secure waste
facility in Barnwell, South Carolina. On September 17, 2004, the plant’s
containment building was demolished by explosives, the first such dem-
olition in the history of nuclear power. At 150 feet tall, the dome was too
large to be taken apart mechanically. A local newspaper reported ap-
proximately 400 people present and that “the mood on site ... was much
like a wake before a funeral,” though both friends and foes alike “burst
into applause.”32
Longtime critics of Maine Yankee like Boston Globe columnist David
Nyhan had predicted a dismal scenario that would only confirm the
mistake of building the plant in the first place. Nyhan extended his pes-
simism to the Seabrook Station nuclear plant in New Hampshire that
had finally opened in 1990. He lamented that “the meltdown of the nu-
clear power industry is far more costly and life-threatening than it ever
had to be,” thanks to those politicians and corporate officials who denied
the economic and environmental facts of life. “Now Seabrook is a Wis-
casset in waiting,” Nyhan concluded, “like 100 other nuclear dinosaurs
whose deadly tails will threaten our offspring a thousand generations
hence.”33 Ironically, an article in Nyhan’s own paper four years earlier
had briefly drawn a picture of the town of Seabrook akin to that of Wis-
casset: “From the Atlantic shores of Seabrook, New Hampshire, the al-
most postcard New England view captures the town’s contrast: modern
concrete buildings of a nuclear power plant against the wooden decks,
grassy beach, and private boats.”34
Where Maine Yankee was built within budget and on time, Seabrook
was completed years behind schedule and billions of dollars over
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budget. For those reasons the planned two reactors were scaled back to
one—and that cost $6.6 billion dollars. More protests surrounded the
plant than any other in the region and, for that matter, perhaps in the
entire nation.35
But Nyhan may have been unduly pessimistic about Maine Yankee,
at least in terms of safety. Radioactive material removal continued until
2005, when grass was planted over the area’s 800 acres. With so much ac-
complished, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission then amended Maine
Yankee’s license, reducing the amount of land under license to the
twelve-acre independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation on Bailey Point
Peninsula in Wiscasset.36
Maine Yankee’s remaining task was to store and eventually dispose of
the 1,434 spent fuel rods temporarily locked away on Bailey Point. These
rods remain toxic for thousands of years. Because of long unresolved po-
litical issues surrounding the designated Yucca Mountain storage facility
in Nevada, 100 miles from Las Vegas, the storage process could take
years, even decades. Many residents of Nevada, and most of its top offi-
cials, now oppose ever using that locale. Indeed, John Baldacci, Maine’s
current governor, has argued that a second such site must be found and
opened to accommodate the metric tons now being stored in temporary
facilities in Maine and elsewhere—an amount that already exceeds the
70,000 metric tons designated for Yucca Mountain. To make matters
worse, Mainers are still paying storage costs that, by the end of 2007, to-
taled over $189 million, with no end in sight.37
The United States Department of Energy had signed a contract with
all American commercial nuclear plant owners to have a disposal facility
open and receiving spent fuel as needed by January 31, 1998. Conse-
quently, Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company and its sister decommis-
sioned Yankee Atomic Power Company plants—Connecticut Yankee
and Massachusetts Yankee Rowe—are in the midst of lawsuits against
the federal government for its failure to remove the spent nuclear fuel
from these three sites. In 2006 the United States Federal Court of Claims
awarded $143 million to those three plants in what might well be the
first of several such allocations, but the federal government is
appealing.38
Life After Maine Yankee
The decision to close the plant prompted a variety of proposals for
redeveloping the site (apart from the area containing the spent fuel
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rods). In 1998 some suggested a huge natural gas plant that, in one sce-
nario, would utilize pipelines connecting Maine to Sable Island off Nova
Scotia. Under this plan, the transmission lines would remain but the
buildings would be torn down and the turbines and generators sold. The
site’s access to large volumes of water was crucial. This proposal even
had the support of anti-nuclear activist Raymond Shadis, who called it
“a grand idea.” Wiscasset’s own Town Planner, Dan Thompson, was
equally enthusiastic and saw such a facility as a key to a possible indus-
trial park. The plan, however, did not materialize.39
In 2003 a group suggested using the area to scrap surplus govern-
ment ships, a process that would have included removing contaminants
and toxic materials and then crushing the steel to be recycled. Several of
the area’s features seem relevant: excellent roads; first-rate municipal
water and sewer treatment facilities; equally fine boat, barge, and rail ac-
cess; and a nearby small airport. This prompted opposition from envi-
ronmentalists concerned with the lack of seaworthiness of such vessels
and the prospect of accidents in narrow channels, plus the danger of
toxic contaminants released into pristine waters. 40
In 2006 a company called National Resources of Greenwich, Con-
necticut, purchased the plant site along with a 431-acre buffer zone. The
company has two projects underway: on the buffer zone there will be “an
office and technology park,” while the power plant “eyesore is being
turned into eye candy—an old-fashioned waterfront village” to be filled
with fine restaurants, microbreweries, upscale stores, art galleries, con-
dominiums, and cottages, and 281 slips for those who wish to park their
boats in the river.” The state-of-the-art marina will include a repair and
retrofit yard and storage facilities, and will be open to vessels of all sizes.
This Point East Maritime Village will be a tribute to both a former Wis-
casset summer colony and the town’s maritime past.41
Notwithstanding these projects, in November 2007 the same com-
pany offered Wiscasset voters, through four separate ordinances, the
prospect of building a new $1.5 billion 700 megawatt coal-fired gasifica-
tion plant on the site of the former reactor. This would have provided a
considerable increase in the community’s tax base following the loss of
most of Maine Yankee’s contribution. According to Scott Houldin, the
proposed project’s manager, the plant would hardly resemble the stereo-
typical coal-plant spewing pollutants into the air. “We don’t burn coal,”
he said. “We create gas from the coal and then that gas is cleaned”—to
such an extent that the plant would actually reduce the state’s total air
emissions. The site was attractive because of its electrical transmission
infrastructure and its rail and deep water access. However, according to
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the environmentally sensitive Maine People’s Alliance — whose phone
canvass team competed with the company’s own — the project would
have “a 400-foot barge of coal . . . up the Sheepscot River daily to feed the
plant’s appetite for coal, turning the river into a barge canal, crippling
the local lobster industry, and potentially harming the shellfish and
worming industries as well.” Meanwhile, the plant would have “released
twenty-two pounds of mercury into the air each year, more than any
other facility in Maine.” Other critics contended that the kind of clean
diesel fuel to be produced would not lower greenhouse gases because the
diesel would be made out of coal, not biomass. Additional critics faulted
the proposed plant’s 230-foot height and visual impact on the commu-
nity. Following outright protests that included a parade of thirty lobster
boats whose owners feared damage to their livelihood, all four ballot
questions were rejected.42
In the years since Maine Yankee closed down, there has been a resur-
gence of interest in nuclear power to offset the environmental damages
and financial costs associated with coal and oil production in the United
States. An analysis of global warming type pollution in Maine between
1990 and 2004 concluded that it had increased by twenty-four percent,
thanks in part to expanded use of natural gas to make the electricity that
replaced the power generated by Maine Yankee until it closed. State fossil
fuel consumption was the principal basis on which the study was done.43
Proponents of wind, water, and solar power have certainly demon-
strated the practicality of those alternative energy sources, but they have
not persuaded a majority of Americans that any (or, for that matter, all
three) could possibly substitute for traditional energy sources or could
possibly replace nuclear power. The George W. Bush Administration
made the revival of nuclear power a component of its energy policy, and
fears of nuclear power accidents have diminished in many quarters.
France’s nuclear industry has been tremendously successful in terms of
productive capacity, providing 80 percent of the nation’s electricity.44
But despite this success, Electricité de France has been plagued by finan-
cial problems—problems that have compounded with the increased cost
of storing radioactive material.45
Despite the virtual shutdown of the industry in recent decades in
terms of new construction, nuclear power still generates about 20 per-
cent of the electricity in the United States. There are currently 104 nu-
clear power reactors in operation in this country, the last one coming
online in 1996, its construction having begun back in 1973. By contrast,
21 companies now expect to seek permission to build 34 new plants,
ranging from New York to Texas to Idaho, and factories are being built in
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Indiana and Louisiana to manufacture plant parts. Much of the renewed
interest derives from the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which “is stuffed
with generous subsidies for nuclear power and other alternatives to fossil
fuels.” As the head of General Electric, Jeffrey Immelt, has argued, “it’s
hard to believe simultaneously in energy security and reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions without believing in nuclear power.”46
Increasing numbers of environmentalists are conceding this point,
among them the famous Stewart Brand, creator of The Whole Earth Cat-
alog. Brand confessed to his traditional opponents: “I’m sorry. I was
wrong, you were right. I’m sorry.”47
Ironically, the preponderance of aging plants is a barrier to nuclear
power’s resurgence in the United States. In order to maintain a 20 per-
cent share in electricity generation, replacement plants will have to be
built fairly soon. There are also such mundane challenges as the rising
cost of steel and concrete and the diminished number of qualified
welders.48
Some advocates for an American “nuclear renaissance” believe that
increasing the capacity and/or the operating life of existing plants is the
most practical measure and certainly a complement to the building of
any outright new plants. As of 2004, eight years after the last new plant
had been completed, this process had increased the output of the na-
tion’s nuclear power plants “by the equivalent of twenty-four new
plants.” 49
One possible new—or, more precisely, partially new—plant could
be the presently dismantled Unit 2 of Seabrook Station. Although there
are no plans to reopen Unit 2, opponents of any revival have made their
concerns amply known. At the fortieth anniversary of the Seacoast Anti-
Pollution League in 2008, they contended that nuclear power remains
obsolete and that renewable energy is still the wave of the future. They
note that “FPL Energy, owner and operator of Seabrook Station, is the
largest provider of wind energy and has the largest solar fields in the
country.” So why not use that expertise instead?50
In addition, opponents of Vermont Yankee want to shut it down be-
cause of safety concerns. In August 2007 the plant’s cooling tower col-
lapsed, the apparent result of rotting wooden timbers that had not been
properly inspected. No radioactivity was released, but this accident took
place just as the plant’s owners had applied to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) for a twenty-year extension of its license beyond its
2012 expiration date. Key opponents include longtime Maine Yankee
critic Raymond Shadis, who contends that the aging plant has other
structural problems. Should the NRC, as likely, grant the extension—it
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has never rejected one and has approved dozens throughout the coun-
try—the state of Vermont may still oppose it. Meanwhile Vermont Yan-
kee provides a third of the state’s electrical generation and the same
dilemma that converted Stewart Brand confronts residents of perhaps
the most environmentally conscious of all of the fifty states. As a New
York Times reporter noted recently, at present Vermont has “only one
commercial wind farm, eleven turbines along a mountain ridge. They
have less than one percent of the capacity of Vermont Yankee,” itself a
relatively small nuclear power plant.51 Should we be surprised that
Maine Yankee’s most passionate defenders have made the same point in
denouncing that plant’s closure? 
To be sure, the possibility of another nuclear power plant catastro-
phe or, perhaps worse, a terrorist attack on a safely operating plant can-
not be ruled out. But retrospective analysis of the Three Mile Island
(TMI) disaster reveals a personnel and a public relations failure rather
than a nuclear catastrophe akin to Chernobyl. In fact, in confirmation of
the arguments made by the fictional John Blaine quoted above, the radi-
ation exposure “even in the most extreme cases” was less than what “any-
one living in the area receives from natural sources.”52
Equally important, decline of the nation’s nuclear power industry
preceded, and so was not caused by, TMI. Where in 1974 President
Richard Nixon predicted 1,000 commercial nuclear reactors by the end
of the twentieth century, “only 250 were ever ordered, only 170 filed for
permits, [and] just 130 opened.” Causes of this decline included unex-
pected building delays and shutdowns, high costs, high interest rates,
protests, and, unexpectedly, reduced electricity demand. In sum, TMI
“didn’t kill the nuclear dream” but instead was “just another nail in the
coffin.”53
It has by now become the conventional wisdom that nuclear power’s
coffin also contained the remains of self-proclaimed “experts” in the
field, whose overly optimistic scenarios received richly deserved burials.
Meanwhile the three referenda on Maine Yankee in the 1980s are often
characterized as demonstrating the superior common-sense wisdom of
ordinary citizens—not least, tough-minded, skeptical Mainers who
could cut through the baseless promises of persistently cheap and effec-
tive power held out by those often arrogant experts. But this picture is
too simplistic.
As historian Brian Balogh demonstrated in his 1991 Chain Reaction:
Expert Debate and Public Participation in American Commercial Nuclear
Power, 1945-1975, the fading of these experts’ luster steadily gave rise to
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the arrival of other experts. The latter’s ranks included not only other
engineers and scientists without the common ties to the nuclear power
industry and government regulatory agencies but also “competing” ex-
perts in biology, economics, environmental studies, and public health.
Alas, this “counter” expertise did not usually lead to improved public
policy formulations or legislation or regulation. Far from it. The naïve
traditional expectations of eventual consensus among experts, compara-
ble to the naïve one-time expectations of nuclear power being “too
cheap to meter,” fell apart amid debate and dissent. In addition, the col-
lapse of Communism and of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early
1990s undermined the historic reliance in the United States upon “na-
tional security” concerns as a means of imposing consensus. Moreover,
the steady fading of the luster and influence of the physicists and other
nuclear power experts associated with the Manhattan Project also un-
dermined that once bedrock faith in experts in this area.54
Growing public skepticism, protest, and opposition, as with Maine
Yankee, must be placed in this more complex context. Critical though it
surely was, public dissent alone did not turn the tide against nuclear
power and its once untouchable decision makers. As one reviewer
phrases Balogh’s argument, “the result was a political Catch-22. Experts
were always in demand for their authority, but the more they became in-
volved the less creditable they seemed. Nevertheless, no substitute for
expertise has yet been found.”55 Instead, the political considerations that
had always been critical to the nation’s nuclear power, far from dimin-
ishing, remained as powerful as ever.
This is not to suggest that Maine Yankee should have remained open
in the face of the technical, environmental, and financial challenges that
confronted its owners and operators in its final years of operation. It is,
however, to suggest that just as Maine Yankee was hardly a genuine tech-
nological utopia at any time, neither was it ever a full-fledged technolog-
ical dystopia. Rather, its history reflects both the positive and negative
aspects of nuclear power, not just in New England but throughout the
country. The utopian promotional rhetoric of the plant’s early years
must therefore be appreciated as more than fantasy and naïveté—as
having some “core” truth to it. Like all serious utopian schemes, the vi-
sion of Maine Yankee and of its peer plants in New England and else-
where must be played back to illuminate the society and the culture that
produced it: an America ambivalent about “atoms for peace” and about
technology’s promise and technology’s peril. It would be a healthy legacy
of Maine Yankee if the growing skepticism among ordinary Americans
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over other apocalyptic dystopian visions concerning technologies could
be viewed in a more balanced, more sophisticated light.
However, lessons from Maine Yankee are being discussed in Maine
itself, and by proponents of a new nuclear plant in, of all places, Wiscas-
set and possibly elsewhere in the state. In addition to the familiar argu-
ments that nuclear power is environmentally friendly, that Maine “is at
the end of all fossil fuel pipelines” — and so will always be paying more
than most other states — and that renewables like solar, wind, wood,
biomass, and tidal power can never provide more than a small fraction
of the state’s energy needs, the traditional stumbling blocks of nuclear
waste storage and of reactor rod reprocessing have been partially re-
moved. France in particular has pioneered in these areas, and its nuclear
plants have convincing safety records. Today’s nuclear power plants re-
quire less potentially fallible mechanisms. In addition, the 2005 Energy
Policy Act allows for streamlining of the application process for new
plants, and plants can now be built much more quickly than decades
ago. But all such initiatives must nevertheless come from Mainers famil-
iar with Maine Yankee’s history and its fate, since those “from away” have
far less interest in enhancing Maine’s energy and environmental futures.
In these ways, Maine Yankee may be a form of “living history.”56
I would like to thank Richard Hill, Professor of Mechanical Engineering
Emeritus, University of Maine, and Mel Johnson, Reference Librarian, Uni-
versity of Maine, for their invaluable assistance in the completion of this ar-
ticle.
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